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TRADEMARKS AS A MEDIA FOR FALSE
ADVERTISING
J. ShaharDillbary*

ABSTRACT

This Article explores an unnoticed aspect of trademark law which
in some instances may constitute a license to cheat. It shows that under
certain circumstances a seller can use its own trademark to mislead its
customers, free from legal sanction, in contexts where the same
behavior would be sanctioned if the seller used other advertising media.
The Article then explores how an alternateconception of the economic
function of trademarks can be used to understand the informational
value of trademarks and their advertisingfunction. After identifying
circumstances appropriatefor legal intervention, the Article concludes
with a proposal for a new interpretation of the false advertising
provision in the Lanham Act to eliminate this disparity.
Key Words: Fraud,FalseAdvertising, TrademarkFraud,Fanciful
Marks, Error Costs, Regulation of Information, Economic Analysis,
Brands.
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

Consider the following two types of strategies available to the
unscrupulous seller who decides to misrepresent the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of its own product. In the
first strategy, the seller may use a descriptive mark to misrepresent the
nature of its product. For example, the seller may use the mark "Simply
Stevia" in connection with a sweetener that is not made from the plant
Stevia.1 In such a case, the seller is engaging in outright fraud-the
name of the product (its trademark) explicitly suggests that the product
possesses an ingredient (i.e., an extract from the plant Stevia) that it
does not. In the second strategy, the seller also misrepresents the
attributes of its own product. This time, however, the false advertising
is committed by a failure to remove a fanciful (non-descriptive) mark,
which denotes in the mind of the public a quality that the product no
longer possesses. For example, Johnson & Johnson might change the
active ingredient of its sweetener so that it is not made from sugar, but
nevertheless continue to affix the mark "Splenda"-which the public
has learned to associate with a sweetener made from sugar-and thus
"suitable for people with diabetes. ' '2
While the two strategies differ only in the method in which the
false information is conveyed to consumers-a descriptive mark versus
a non-descriptive mark-their impact is identical. In both cases the
public is misled. Nevertheless, the law treats the two strategies
differently. While the first type-that of false advertising using a
descriptive mark-gives competitors a private cause of action under
section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Trademark (Lanham) Act, the second-that
of false advertising using a non-descriptive mark--does not. As one of
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A in Law, Bar-Ilan
University; LL.B. in Economics, Bar-Ilan University; LL.M., University of Chicago School of
Law; J.S.D., University of Chicago School of Law. I would like to thank Alan Durham, Joe
Colquitt, Dan Joyner, Ken Rosen, Paul Horwitz, Fred Vars, Ann Bartow, Gil Sadka, Adam
Candeub, Sean Pager, Robert Bone, Bill Landes, Bob Brauneis, Lisa Bernstein, Peter Yu, Caryn
Roseman and the participants of the Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable, the Michigan
State University JSIP, the Hebrew University Intellectual Property Workshop, and the European
Law and Economics Conference.
I See Stevita's Product List, http://stevitastevia.com/content/blogcategory/27/50/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2009).
2 See generally Splenda® Brand Sweetener, http://www.splenda.com (last visited Oct. 26,
2009). In November 2004, Merisant (the maker of Equal) filed a complaint against the marketer
of Splenda, McNeil Corp., a Johnson & Johnson (J&J) company, alleging that J&J's
advertisement that Splenda is "made from sugar so it tastes like sugar" is false and misleading in
that it ties Splenda to sugar and implies that Splenda is natural when in fact it is not. This is an
allegedly false affirmative and descriptive statement and, thus, one which belongs to the first type
of cases discussed above.
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the main treatises on trademarks explains, only descriptive marks can be
3
misleading; non-descriptive marks cannot.
This Article seeks to explain and remedy this asymmetry in the
application of the law by investigating the role of trademarks and the
relation between trademark law and the law of false advertising. Part II
focuses on trademark law. It shows that a trademark provides
consumers primarily with two types of information, each serving a
different function. 4 First, a trademark provides information about the
source of the product. Information about the source of the product
serves an inter-brandfunction: It helps the consumer identify and select
the product she wants from a set of substitutable products. The
consumer who receives a recommendation about the sweetener made by
Johnson & Johnson does not have to remember the product's qualities
or the name of its manufacturer. She only needs to ask for "Splenda."
This function has been the focus of the law. With one exceptiontrademark abandonment-traditional trademark law, by prohibiting
different forms of passing-off, shields consumers only from inter-brand
confusion. It ensures that when the consumer asks for A's product she
does not receives B's.
But a trademark can also provide information about the product
itself. Information provided by a mark reduces consumers' uncertainty
and impacts the number of units purchased. A trademark conveys
information about the product if it is descriptive. Marks such as
"Simply Stevia," for a sweetener made of the plant Stevia, and
"SweeTarts," for a fruit-flavored sugar candy, clearly describe the
products to which they are attached. But even a non-descriptive mark
can have a descriptive value if, through advertising, the public learns to
associate the mark with a specific quality. "Splenda," for example,
means to many a sweetener which is made of sugar and suitable for
people with diabetes. Similarly, the public has learned to associate the
mark "Snickers" with a chocolate bar containing peanuts.
Although both functions are crucial to consumers and the
marketplace, trademark law protects the former but not the latter.
Trademark law protects consumers from passing-off (inter-brand fraud),
but it does not protect consumers against the trademark owner that uses
its own non-descriptive mark to misrepresent its own goods (intra-brand
fraud). This bizarre outcome is the result of the traditionally accepted
3 See IA RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND

MONOPOLIES § 5:11 (Louis Altman & Malla Pollack eds., West 4th ed. 2009). The author is of
the opinion that only descriptive marks can serve as a media for false advertising: "It is now
recognized that trademarks and trade names perform an invaluable advertising function. When
these are descriptive (or misdescriptive), they may prove misleading." Id. (emphasis added).
4 For a broad view of the role of trademarks and their signaling and persuasive value, see,
e.g., J. Shahar Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting Irrational
Beliefs, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 605 (2007) (explaining the economics of anti-dilution).
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premise that "the only legally relevant function of a trademark is to
'5
impart information as to the source or sponsorship of the product."
This Article challenges this statement. It argues that a trademark often
provides two types of information-information about the source of the
product and information about the product itself-each of which merits
protection.
One facet of this limited view is the trademark hierarchy. The
hierarchy classifies trademarks according to their distinctiveness-that
is, according to the mark's ability to distinguish the seller's goods "from
those of others and identify[] the source of the goods."'6 At the top of
this hierarchy are fanciful marks (e.g., "Splenda"). These are terms that
are invented by the trademark owner for the sole purpose of identifying
products in the marketplace. Lower in the hierarchy are descriptive
marks (e.g., "Simply Stevia"). These are pre-existing words in the
language. A descriptive term can serve as a mark only if, in addition to
describing the product, it also has gained a "secondary meaning" in the
mind of the public as denoting a source of manufacture.7 This Article
argues that although the hierarchy may have value in analyzing whether
a mark serves its inter-brand function (i.e., identifies a source), the
hierarchy has been wrongly imported to section 43(a)(1)(B), which
deals with false advertising. Courts and commentators have taken the
position that only descriptive marks can be used as a media for false
advertising. Conversely, this Article argues that even a fanciful mark,
although created for the sole purpose of denoting a source of
manufacture or sale, may over time gain a descriptive value or, as
referred to in this article, a "secondary descriptive meaning." Through
advertising, a mark may be associated by the public with an attribute or
quality of the product to which it is attached. If so, the mark may be
used by its owner to mischaracterize its own product.
Part III focuses on the law of false advertising. It shows that the
inter-brand view that dominates trademark law has been wrongly
adopted in the context of false advertising. This is well illustrated in
cases such as New York & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co.8 and

5 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added); Wells Fargo &
Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Waddington N. Am. Bus.
Trust v. EMI Plastics, Inc., No. 02-3781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16634, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5,
2002); Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 89-5463, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20564, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 1991); see also Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510
(7th Cir. 2002); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 788-89 (2003) ("Trademark law thus historically limited
itself to preventing uses of marks that 'defrauded the public' by confusing people into believing
that an infringer's goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark holder.").
6 Retail Servs. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2004).
7 Trademark (Lanham) Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (2006).
8 44 F. 277 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890).
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American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co.,9 where it was
held that fraud on one's own consumers (intra-brand fraud), while
explicitly recognized as a "great evil," was not actionable. 10 Only a
fraud committed by one competitor against another (inter-brand fraud)
was actionable. In Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, the petitioner
even argued that "no statute or decided case has declared that a
manufacturer or trader owes to his competitors the duty of refraining
from misrepresentation of the quality or ingredients of his own goods,
and that, on the contrary, it has been firmly held that no such duty
exists." 11
In 1946, Congress enacted section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
new section was interpreted to provide a remedy against the seller who
misrepresents its own good, but the protection was incomplete. Even
after the passage of the Lanham Act, and despite its clear language, a
descriptive mark can give rise to a false advertising claim, whereas a
non-descriptive mark that has gained a "secondary descriptive meaning"
cannot. The result is a license to cheat against which consumers have
no or very limited protection. 12 To remedy this situation, Part IV argues
for the adoption of an interpretation that follows from the strict reading
of the Lanham Act. Under this interpretation, competitors of the
fraudulent-those with the incentives and resources to detect fraudwould be able to go after the fraudulent and serve their traditional role
in trademark law as the avengers of the public. Part V provides
concluding remarks.

II.
A.

TRADEMARK LAW

The Inter-BrandFunction:DistinguishingGoods

A trademark is a word, name, or symbol that a seller uses "to
distinguish... [its] goods.., from those manufactured or sold by
others."' 3 Trademarks serve this inter-brand function by denoting a
single source of sale or manufacture which, in turn, assures the
consumer that the product (because it is manufactured by the same
entity) has consistent qualities over time.14 To illustrate, suppose that a
F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
& R. Cement Co., 44 F. at 279; see also infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
F. 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1922) (emphasis added).
a discussion of the efficacy of other private causes of action that may be available to
consumers (such as the tort of fraud and class actions) and the role of regulatory agencies, see
infra Part II.C.
13 Trademark (Lanham) Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946) (emphasis added).
14 See Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991); 1 J.
9 103
10 N.Y
11 281
12 For

THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:10, at 3-20,
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customer at the local caf6 wishes to put a sweetener in her coffee. She

can choose "Equal, .... Splenda," or "Simply Stevia" (to name a few of
the most common brands). Assume further that she had a favorable
experience with "Splenda" and she wants to use it again. In a world
with no trademarks, instead of simply asking for "Splenda," the
consumer would bear high search costs. She would have to read the
fine print on the label of each sweetener until she finds the one she
wants. She would also incur high communication costs when she
conveys her choice to the seller. Absent trademarks, she would have to
ask for "the natural no-calorie sweetener that is derived from sugar and
made by Johnson & Johnson." By using the brand name, on the other
hand, the consumer economizes on her costs. She does not have to
remember who the manufacturer is or what the product's attributes are;
she only needs to ask for "Splenda." Trademark law is designed to
protect this very function. By prohibiting passing-off, trademark law
ensures that when the consumer asks for A's product she does not
receive B's. The consumer who asks for "Splenda" can be assured that
she will receive Johnson & Johnson's sweetener, not a competing

product. In fact, according to some, this is the only function trademark
law currently protects. 15 Courts and scholars have taken the view that
"the only legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart
information as to the source or sponsorship of the product.' 6
The reason for this limited protection can be traced to the origins

of trademark law. Historically, the law of unfair competition has its
roots in the common law tort of deceit.17 It was motivated by "a strong
desire to protect the rights of the first user of the mark" against the
"unjust" attempts of a subsequent user to pass-off its goods.'

8

Put

3-21 (West 4th ed. 2009) ("[T]he chief function of a trademark is a kind of 'warranty' to
purchasers that they will receive, when they purchase goods bearing the mark, goods of the same
character and source, anonymous as it may be, as other goods previously purchased bearing the
mark that have already given the purchaser satisfaction." (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. La Maur, Inc.,
1968 WL 8144 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 1968)).
15 For an analysis of the economic and legal function of anti-dilution law see Dillbary, supra
note 4.
16 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Waddington N. Am. Bus. Trust v. EMI
Plastics, Inc., No. 02-3781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16634, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002);
Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 89-5463, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20564, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 1991); see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods.").
17 1 MCCARTHY supra note 14, § 2:34, at 2-61; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Walt-West Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).
18 Jewel Cos. v. Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C.
Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910); Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False
Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 816 (1999); Alison M. Andrews, Note,
Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: American
Home Prods. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 47 ALB. L. REV. 97, 103 (1982).
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differently, trademark infringement was perceived as a fraud committed
by one competitor against another rather than a fraud on consumers. 19
Thus, it was the competitor-defendant's intent to deceive (rather than
consumer confusion) that was an essential element of trademark
infringement.
With the passage of time, however, this approach has been
replaced by the recognition that both consumers and competitors are the
"victims" of trademark infringement. "By applying a trademark to
goods produced by one other than the trademark's owner, the infringer
deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and
money to obtain" and the consumers "of their ability to distinguish
among the goods of competing manufacturers. '20 The change of
purpose underlying trademark law led to the abandonment of the intent
requirement and the adoption of the current standard: a showing of
likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers. 2 1 But the types of
confusion necessary for trademark infringement remained limited to
inter-brandsituations. "On-Sale Confusion" is one which occurs at the
time of purchase. It happens in cases when one producer passes-off its
product as another's. The consumer who wishes to buy A's product is
mislead to buy B's. "Pre-Sale Confusion" (or "initial interest
confusion") is aimed to lure consumers by creating a false impression as
to origin or affiliation, which dissipates just before an actual purchase
takes place but nevertheless "locks in" consumers. In Elvis Presley
Enterprises, for example, the defendant, an operator of a night club
named "The Velvet Elvis," created confusion as to its affiliation with
the Elvis Presley Estate. 22 Although upon entering consumers had no
doubt that it was not affiliated with the Presley Estate, they nevertheless
stayed (because of the inconvenience of leaving the club and searching
for another). "Post-Sale Confusion" is neither a confusion of actual or
potential consumers, but rather that of the observing public in mistaking
for an original the cheap imitation bought by the consumer. It usually
occurs when a manufacturer offers consumers cheap knockoffs of an
expensive product, thus allowing a buyer to acquire the prestige of
owning what appears to be a luxurious product at a lower cost. 23 In
such a case, even though the buyer knew that she was getting an
imitation, viewers would be confused. "Reverse Passing-Off' is yet
19 Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 1980).
20 Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982); Dadirrian v. Yacubian, 98 F.
872 (1st Cir. 1990); S.REP. No. 1333, at 1274-77 (1946).
21 Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1952). Nor is there a
requirement to prove an intent to confuse. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d
1199 (9th Cir. 2000).
22 Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Blockbuster
Entm't Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
23 Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000).
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another type of confusion. It occurs when one producer sells another's
24
goods as if they were its own.
Whether classified as "on-sale," "pre-sale," "post-sale," or
"reverse"--all forms of confusion actionable under section 32 of the
Lanham Act are aimed at protecting the inter-brand function of
trademarks. They protect the consumers from a form of passing-off.
Section 32 provides the trademark owner with remedies when
confusion between different manufacturers or different products occurs.
It does not provide relief in cases in which it is the trademark owner
itself that uses its own mark to misrepresent its own goods.
To ensure that a trademark fulfills its inter-brand function and
hence deserves protection, trademark law categorizes marks into five
classes: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.
Fanciful terms, which are afforded the highest protection, are not real
words, but are invented to serve as marks (e.g., "Splenda"). They are
invented for the sole purpose of denoting a source of manufacture.
Arbitrary terms use common words in the vernacular in an unfamiliar
way that bears no logical relation to the actual characteristics of the
goods (e.g., "Apple" for personal computers). Suggestive terms also
use pre-existing words to suggest, rather than describe, the
characteristics of the goods (e.g., "Equal" for a sweetener). Descriptive
terms employ common words in their ordinary use to describe a
characteristic or ingredient of the product (e.g., "Simply Stevia"). 25 A
26
generic term refers to an entire class of products (e.g., sweetener).
Under this hierarchy fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks
automatically qualify for trademark protection. Because they are used
solely for the purpose of denoting a source of manufacture, other sellers
cannot use these terms short of committing trademark infringement.
Descriptive terms are afforded protection, provided a "secondary
meaning" is proved-that is, when the term not only describes an
attribute of the product to which it is attached, but also is associated by
the public with a single source. The protection accorded to the owner of
a descriptive mark, however, is "thin." Other sellers may use the
descriptive term to describe their own products. For example, a
sweetener manufacturer may advertise its product as "containing
Stevia" even though the Stevita Stevia Company has the right in the
24 For example, where B, a wine seller, replaces the labels on A's bottles, thus representing
itself as the source. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th
Cir. 1987).
25 A descriptive term is a term that identifies a characteristic or quality of an article such as its
color, odor, function, dimension, or ingredient. See Zatarains v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698
F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983); Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir.1980).
26 See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001); A.J.
Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986); DowBrands v. Helene Curtis, Inc.,
863 F. Supp. 963 (D. Minn. 1994).
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mark "Simply Stevia." This so called "fair use" doctrine is meant to
ensure that trademarks are not used strategically by their owners to raise
rivals' costs. If competitors of Stevita Stevia Company could not use
the term "Stevia" they would have to use other words in the vernacular
to describe their products. For example, they would have to describe
their products as containing a substance made of "any plant of the genus
Stevia or the closely related genus Piqueria having glutinous foliage and
white or purplish flowers. '27 This would be more costly and harder to
understand. For this reason, generic terms that are considered purely
descriptive of a product genus, and thus indispensable, cannot enjoy any
trademark protection. As demonstrated below, although the hierarchy
can help determine whether a mark fulfills its inter-brand function (to
identify a source), it cannot be used to determine whether a mark fulfills
an intra-brand function. Courts relying on the trademark hierarchy,
however, have wrongly concluded that only a descriptive mark can be
misleading.
B.

The Intra-BrandFunction: Describingthe Product'sAttributes

In addition to its inter-brand function (distinguishing goods by
signifying a single source of sale), a trademark serves an intra-brand
function when it provides information about the product to which it is
attached. As has been shown elsewhere, 28 information about the
product also reduces consumer search costs by minimizing uncertainty
regarding the product's qualities, thereby influencing the number of
units purchased:
To illustrate, consider ...the caffeine-aware consumer who has been
advised not to consume more than the 300mg of caffeine per day
suggested by the American Diabetic Association. Assume further
that she has already made her (inter-brand) choice and decided to
order Starbucks Vanilla Grande because she prefers its taste to
others. The next question-How many cups of coffee should she
order?--calls for an intra-brand analysis. If the consumer believes
that the drink is low in caffeine, she will be willing to order more
cups of coffee and vice versa. For example, if the average amount of
caffeine in a cup of coffee is 266mgs, the consumer, absent more
information, would purchase only one unit, so as not to exceed the
300mg daily cap. But if she knows that Starbucks Vanilla Grande
contains only 150mgs of caffeine, she would increase her
consumption and purchase two units. The consumer who prefers
27 Dictionary.com, WordNet® 3.0. Princeton University, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/stevia (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
28 J.Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The InformationalFunction of Trademarks, 40
ARIz. ST. L.J (forthcoming Winter 2009).
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Starbucks Decaf Espresso, on the other hand, absent more
information, would be willing to purchase up to 60 units if she
believes it contains the average amount of caffeine-5mgs. But if
she knew that Starbucks Decaf Espresso contains 32mgs of caffeine,
she would reduce her consumption and purchase up to 9 units only.
A trademark, therefore, helps the consumer not only choose the right
product but also choose the optimal number of units from that
product.

29

In Getting the Word Out: The Informational Function of
Trademarks, I show that both over-consumption and underconsumption of goods results in a deadweight loss that can be avoided
by conveying truthful information to the consumer about the product's
qualities. 30
A trademark can undoubtedly provide intra-brand information
about the product it is attached to if it is descriptive. Marks such as
"Wonderful Fish-Fri" for a coating used to fry fish, 3 1 "SweeTarts" for a
fruit-flavored sugar candy, 32 and "Simply Stevia" for a sweetener made
of Stevia clearly describe the products to which they are attached. But
descriptive marks are not the only marks that can have a descriptive
value. In some cases, even a non-descriptive (fanciful, arbitrary, or
suggestive) mark may gain a descriptive value. This is often the case
when a product with a new attribute--one which the language fails to
describe-is introduced into the marketplace. Absent the appropriate
word, trademarks may fill the linguistic gap. 33 Over time, because of
accumulating experience with the product and its popularity, a
trademark may be used to describe the nameless attribute. The process
is analogous to the "secondary meaning" doctrine under which the law
recognizes that a descriptive mark may gain a distinctive meaning as a
source. Similarly, a suggestive, arbitrary, and even a fanciful mark may
acquire a "secondary descriptive meaning" of an attribute.
A non-descriptive mark can also gain a secondary descriptive
meaning because of massive advertising. Because a trademark has a
sponge-like quality, 34 the public may learn to associate a mark-any
type of mark-not only with a certain source, but also with a certain
attribute or quality of the product to which it is affixed. Moreover, in
many situations the non-descriptive trademark is the only means to
29 Id. at

*5.

30 Id. at *13.
31 Zatarains, Inc., v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
32 Sunmark, Inc., v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1995).
33 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation,65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 397-98 (1990); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We
Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham
Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123 (1996); Alex Kozinski,
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993).
34 3 CALLMANN, supra note 3, § 17:4.
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communicate information about the product to costumers. Reverting
back to the Starbucks example, the customer who chose to enter a
Starbucks caf6 cannot receive any information about the amount of
caffeine in her coffee. The coffee is served without the original
packaging and the information is not readily available to consumers at
the store. The only way the consumer can acquire the intra-brand
information is through the mark that is attached to the product. 35 By
checking consumer reports, the Internet, or comparative advertising, the
consumer may learn to associate "Starbucks Vanilla Grande" with
"150mg" of caffeine, and "Splenda" with an ingredient ("made of
sugar") and a quality ("suitable for people with diabetes").
The point is that in the context offalse advertising, the traditional
trademark hierarchy is inapplicable. Even a fanciful term, which was
invented for the sole purpose of denoting a source, may gain a
descriptive value. Put differently, when analyzed in the context of false
advertising, all types of marks, even if not born equal, should be so
36
treated.
Examples of fanciful marks and terms that have acquired a
secondary descriptive meaning include: "Dr. Price," for a baking
powder containing cream of tartar rather than phosphate; 37 "Woody
Allen," as an epithet for a neurotic personality; and "Schwarzenegger,"
as a synonym for supernatural physical strength. Another example of a
fanciful "public figure" who has received a secondary descriptive
meaning is Barbie. The blonde glamorous doll (formerly "known" as
Barbara Millicent Roberts) has been in the spotlight since 1959 and has
become an American idol. Stories about her "breakup" with Ken, her
boyfriend of forty-three years (1961-2004), have been reported by the
media. The shocking news was reported by mainstream news providers
such as CNN, MSNBC, BBC, and USA Today, as well as tabloids such
as the SexNews Daily.38 The couple's "business manager," Mr. Russell
Arons, vice president of marketing at Mattel, Inc. (the doll's
manufacturer), explained that Barbie and Ken felt "it's time to spend

See Dillbary, supra note 28.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:73, 11-169 ("All trademarks are not equal.").
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
It's Splitsville for Barbie and Ken, CNN.COM, Feb. 12, 2004, http://web.archive.org/
web/20061211085232ml/www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/12/offbeat.barbie.breakup.ap/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Splitsville]; Barbie and Ken Splitting After 43-Year Romance,
MSNBC.cOM, Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4250262 (last visited Oct. 27,
13,
2004,
Feb.
BBC NEWS,
Passion Over for Barbie and Ken,
2009);
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3484949.stm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009); Barbie and
2004,
12,
Feb.
USATODAY.COM,
Romance,
43-Year
Splitting After
Ken
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2004-02-12-barbie-ken-x.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009);
Relationships: Society Reeling from Barbie & Ken Breakup, SEXNEWS DAILY, Feb. 17, 2004,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060109002410/http://www.sexnewsdaily.com/issue/
b504-021704.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
35
36
37
38
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some quality time apart."' 39 Like other celebrity couples, reported Mr.

Russell, "their Hollywood romance has come to an end," but he
promised that "the duo will remain friends. '40
That Barbie has come to denote more than a plastic doll with
origins in Mattel is evident from a number of high-profile cases in
which the plastic-wrapped celebrity has been involved. In Mattel, Inc.
v. Walking Mountain Productions,4 1 the court found that a series of

photos showing Barbie in sexual positions was not infringing. The
court noted that "Mattel, through impressive marketing, has established
Barbie as the ideal American woman and a symbol of American
girlhood," and concluded that "Barbie ...conveys these messages in a
particular way that is ripe for social comment. '42 Another episode in
the never-ending "Barbie wars" includes Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc.,43 where the defendant music companies distributed the successful
hip-hop song "Barbie Girl" created by the popular Danish band Aqua.
In that song, one band-member "impersonated" Barbie (how can you
impersonate a doll?), singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice while
another, calling himself Ken (Barbie's ex-boyfriend), 44 enticed Barbie
to "go party." The song speaks of "a Barbie girl," "a blond bimbo girl,"
living in a "Barbie world" where "life in plastic [is] fantastic." Whether
one agrees with the image that the song pokes fun at or the values that
the band members attach to Barbie, it is clear that the fanciful mark
"Barbie" has become a cultural icon, with many faces and many
associations which, at present, no other term in the vernacular can
45
convey.
39 Splitsville, supra note 38.
40 Id.

41 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
42 Id. The photographer, Thomas Forsythe depicted the famous doll in absurd and sexual
positions by juxtaposing a nude Barbie with kitchen appliances. The message behind the
photographs (according to the artist) was to "critique [] the objectification of women associated
with [Barbie], and [][to] lambaste the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of
women as objects because this is what Barbie embodies." Id. at 796 (emphasis added); see also
Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding defendant clothed
Barbie dolls with sadomasochistic attires).
43 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
44 Barbie's new boyfriend is Blaine, "a suave good-lookin' Aussie surfer." Press Release,
Mattel, Inc., Barbie® Names Hot Australian Hunk as Her New Beau (Jun. 29, 2004), availableat
http://www.shareholder.comn/mattel/news/20040629-137999.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
However, rumors about a possible reunification of the couple have found their way to the media.
Press Release, Mattel, Inc., Hollywood's Insiders Spotted Giving Advice to America's Beloved
Leading Man, Fueling Rumors of a Total Makeover (Oct. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.shareholder.com/mattel/news/20051021-177013.cfrn (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
45 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900 ("[Some] trademarks transcend their identifying
purpose. Some trademarks enter our public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary. How else do you say that something's 'the Rolls Royce of its class'? What else is a
quick fix, but a Band-Aid? Does the average consumer know to ask for aspirin as 'acetyl
salicylic acid'? Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to
our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our

2009]

TRADEMARKS AND FALSE ADVERTISING

C.

339

Intra-BrandFraudUsing a FancifulMark

Trademarks are thus more than just marks of trade. Sometimes
they cross the line and become part of one's culture and vernacular.
They fill a linguistic gap and serve as a means of communication.
When that happens, contrary to the traditional trademark hierarchy,
even a fanciful mark can acquire a secondary descriptive meaning.
Sometimes the meaning is fuzzy or evocative: It might spur a plethora
of associations "without suggesting anything definite about the nature of
the product. '46 Examples are Rolls Royce and Schwarzenegger. But
the secondary descriptive meaning can be very specific. It may convey
information about a certain ingredient, attribute, or a process of
manufacture.
The flip side is that a trademark, even a non-descriptive one, may
serve as a medium for intra-brandfalseadvertising. A seller may passoff its own product, not as someone else's, but as possessing attributes
that it does not have. In the sweetener example, if Johnson & Johnson
changed its sweetener so that it is not made from sugar and thus
unsuitable for people with diabetes, consumers would be defrauded.
They would purchase "Splenda" thinking it possesses attributes that it
does not. Trademark law, however, focuses on the mark's inter-brand
function, and does not protect the secondary descriptive meaning (or,
intra-brand information) that a mark may sometimes possess. The result
is that Johnson & Johnson would likely be off the hook.
True, consumers may be able to recover under the tort of fraud (or
other private causes of action), but that is unlikely for a number of
reasons. First, consumers rarely have the means and resources to detect
the fraud and recover their damages. Second, the damage to the
consumer may be small and may not justify the high litigation costs. A
class action may mitigate some of these problems. For example, a
competitor may notify a potential consumer-plaintiff about the fraud
and collaborate with her in order to prove it. A class action, however, is
not an easy mechanism and plaintiffs often face serious obstacles. It
may also fail if transaction costs between the collaborating parties (the
competitor, the consumer-plaintiff, and their lawyers) are prohibitive.

language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law." (citation omitted) (emphasis
added)); see also Barbie at 50: In the Pink, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2009, at 72; Suzi Parker, Happy
Birthday, Barbie, ECONOMIST (THE WORLD IN 2009 SPECIAL ISSUE), Nov. 19, 2008, availableat
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfmn?storyid=12494653 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
46 Alan L. Durham, Trademarks and the Landscape of Imagination, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1181,
1217 (2006) (defining the term "evocative marks" in the context of descriptive or misdescriptive
geographic marks).
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But even in a world free of transaction and litigation costs, the need to
divide the fruit of the litigation among the collaborating parties may
result in no litigation at all. Assume for example, that the expected
benefit from the litigation is $100 and that the expected cost of
detecting the fraud is $60. If the competitor is pressed to share the
benefits from the litigation with a potential consumer-plaintiff at a 5050 ratio, the competitor will not attempt to unravel the fraud. 47
Investing $60 in order to gain $50 is simply bad business. Moreover,
even if the litigation may result in a net profit to the competitor, the
competitor will not pursue the litigation if its opportunity cost is higher.
To illustrate, if the competitor needs to decide whether to (a) invest $60
in detecting a fraud when there is a 70% probability that it will receive
$100 (representing an expected net gain of $10), or (b) invest the same
amount in a project (e.g., introducing a new product or improving an
existing one) that would yield $20 in profits, the competitor would of
course choose the latter option.
Nor can regulation serve as a comprehensive solution. Agencies
such as the Federal Trade Commission have limited budgets and
personnel and must prioritize their enforcement efforts. Providing
competitors with a private cause of action creates an alternative marketbased solution. Because consumers' and competitors' incentives are
aligned (both are injured by the fraud), providing competitors with
incentives to go after the fraudulent (via a private cause of action) will
benefit both.
This Article thus calls for the adoption of a new interpretation to

47 This situation calls to mind a game theory experiment, known as the "ultimatum game." In
the typical ultimatum game the first player (the "offeror") receives a certain amount of money, r,
and proposes a division in which she gets a and the second player (the "offeree") receives n - a.
If the offeree accepts the proposal, each actor keeps her share (7t- a, a), but if the offeree rejects
the proposal neither actor receives anything. The argument is that if both actors are "rational,"
the offeror would offer the minimum possible (i.e., one cent) because such an offer should be
accepted by the offeree (it would make her better off) and would maximize the offeror's wealth.
In the scenario above, one may argue that the potential plaintiff would be willing to accept any
amount of money rather than a fifty-fifty division. The ultimatum game's prediction, however,
fails in experiments. In fact, actors often behave in a manner some consider to be a "fair" (rather
than self-interest or welfare-maximizing) behavior. See e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 n.6 (2007) (noting that "offers are usually... generous [they offer more
than the minimum offer], and when they are not they are usually refused"); W. Girth, R.
Schmittberger & B. Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,3 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 384 (1982) ("Independent of the game form, subjects often rely on what
they consider a fair or justified result ....
The typical consideration of a player 2 [the
offeree] ... seems to be as follows: 'if player 1 left a fair amount to me, I will accept it. If not
and I do not sacrifice much, I will punish [player I by declining]."). But regardless of the
interpretation of these results (whether they indicate "irrationality" or just a certain preference),
one should note that the above situation does not follow the simple "ultimatum game" paradigm.
One reason is that unlike the offeree, who has nothing to lose but only something to gain from the
offer (n - a), the potential plaintiff will likely incur some costs (reputational, opportunity, etc.)
and hence is likely to require some compensation.
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section 43(a) of the Lanham Act that would provide a competitor with a
cause of action against a manufacturer that engages in intra-brand fraud.
It is important to note, however, that not every intra-brand fraud
requires such legal intervention. If the fraud can be easily detected, the
seller, anticipating that consumers will reveal the fraud, will be deterred
from such activity altogether. If the manufacturer of "Skittles" decided
to change its product so that instead of pieces of fruit candies it would
contain yellow peanut butter delights, the harm to consumers would be
trivial. The consumer would be able to detect the change pre-purchase
(if the packaging was transparent) or immediately after having
purchased the product and tasted its contents. For this reason, products
that are characterized by search qualities (qualities that can be verified
pre-purchase) or experience qualities (qualities that can be easily
checked post-purchase) enjoy a self-enforcing mechanism. The law
needs to play very little role, if any, in such settings. But where the
product has credence qualities (qualities that cannot be easily checked
or where evaluation will be prohibitively costly), there is a true
incentive for sellers to misrepresent the nature of their products.
Examples of such qualities include: the number of calories in a
sweetener (is it truly calorie-free?); the material of which a sweetener is
made (is it derived from sugar, herbs, or synthetic substances?); or the
therapeutic effects of a sweetener (is it really suitable for people with
diabetes?). In all of these cases, the consumer who purchased "Splenda"
or "Simply Stevia" cannot answer any of the questions raised. She is at
the mercy of the seller whose product she has purchased.
Moreover, not every change in the product's credence qualities
may cause a mark (whether descriptive or fanciful) to be deceptive.
Sellers should, and often do, change their products to improve their
quality because of a change in trends or due to an increase in the price
of inputs. Only if(a) consumers associate the mark with the credence
attribute that has been changed, and (b) such an attribute was important
or material to their purchasing decision, should the law require the seller
to inform consumers of the change in its product.
The materiality requirement is not a stranger to trademark law. In
fact, trademark law protects misdescriptive marks-and even
deceptively misdescriptive marks-so long as the misrepresentation
does not impact the consumer's purchasing decision. A mark is
"misdescriptive" if it misdescribes the nature, characteristics, quality, or
the origins of the goods. "Ivory Soap" and "Alaska Bananas" are two
examples. Misdescriptive marks do not cause any confusion (no one
believes the soap is made from ivory or that Alaska is the origin of the
bananas) and are thus registerable. A mark is "deceptively
misdescriptive" if, in addition to being misdescriptive, consumers are
likely to believe the misrepresentation. For example, the term "Glass
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Wax" may be deceptively misdescriptive if consumers believe that the
cleaning material contains wax although it does not. A mark is
"deceptive" if the misrepresentation is not only misleading, but is also a
material factor in the purchasing decision. Thus, if consumers purchase
"Glass Wax" because they believe it contains wax, the mark will be
considered deceptive.
Deceptively misdescriptive marks are
registerable upon a showing of a secondary meaning. Deceptive marks,
on the other hand, can never be registered.
But just as a descriptive mark can misdescribe a product, so can a
non-descriptive mark that has gained a secondary descriptive meaning.
Thus, a fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive mark should be deemed
deceptive if it misdescribes the product, and the misrepresentation
affects the consumer's decision. For the diabetic consumer who
purchases "Splenda" believing it is made from sugar-and thus suitable
for people with diabetes-using the term "Splenda" without a warning
that the basic ingredient of the sweetener has been changed is just as
misleading as using the descriptive phrase "suitable for people with
diabetes."
With one exception, however, trademark and false
advertising law only protect consumers against false advertising using a
descriptive (or misdescriptive) mark or phrase. False advertising by
fanciful, suggestive, and arbitrary terms is section 43(a) immune.
D.

TrademarkAbandonment: An Intra-BrandPhenomenon

Although trademark law is aimed at protecting the inter-brand
function, one exception exists: the law of trademark abandonment.
Unlike trademark infringement, abandonment of a trademark is an
intra-brand phenomenon. It is an action or omission made by the
trademark owner itself that renders the mark abandoned and throws it
into the public domain. 48 Two special cases of abandonment are of
interest to us. In each, the trademark owner uses its fanciful mark to
misrepresent the characteristicsand nature of its own products. The
first line of cases is concerned with the transfer of rights in a trademark.
Under both the common law and the Lanham Act, a sale of a trademark
apart from its goodwill, or the licensing of a mark without adequate
control over the quality and nature of the goods to which it is affixed,
48 Once abandoned, a mark is subject to cancellation by both competitors and the FTC (under
section 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1064 (2009)) and it falls into the public domain,
where it is immediately available to others. Rosenburg v. Fremont Undertaking Co., 63 Wash.
52, 55 (1911). In practice, however, because consumers may still associate the mark with its
former owner, a subsequent user may be required to take reasonable precautions to prevent
confusion. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 413
(7th Cir. 1994); Interstate Distilleries, Inc. v. Sherwood Distilling & Distrib. Co., 173 Md. 173,
181 (Md. 1937).

2009]

TRADEMARKS AND FALSE ADVERTISING

343

renders that transfer invalid and acts as an abandonment. 49 Courts refer
to such a sale or license as "naked" or "in gross." The rule prohibiting
assignments in gross is designed to prevent consumers' intra-brand
confusion. Absent control, 50 the licensing or assignment of a mark
creates the danger that products bearing the same trademark might be of
diverse qualities, in which case the public will be misled: "The
consumer might buy a product thinking it to be of one quality or having
'51
certain characteristics and could find it only too late to be another.
The second line of cases in which the use of a mark-any type of
mark-acts as an abandonment is where the seller changes the attribute,
formula, or nature of its product but nevertheless continues to use its
mark in connection with the altered product. As in the first line of
cases, the public is confused; not about the product's source (the source
has not changed), but about the product itself. Not every change,
however, gives rise to abandonment. Only when the change is so
"substantial" that the public will be misled by the continued use of the
mark will it be considered abandoned. 52 Such a "substantial change"
49 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Hy-Cross
Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 949-50 (C.C.P.A. 1962); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14,
§ 17:6-7.
50 In the early days of the common law the prevailing view was a trademark could not be
transferred by licensing or by way of assignment, with or without control. The reason was the
strict view of trademarks as serving only one function: signifying for consumers the product's
physical source or origin. Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 475
(Cal. Ct. App. 1901). The rationale was that the consumer would be misled because the mark
would be used by a seller-licensee not associated with the real manufacturing "source" in the
physical sense of the word. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 18:39, at 18-78; K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). Although still predicated on the source theory, that law has
gradually changed so that a trademark cannot be assigned, or its use licensed, except as incidental
to a transfer of the business or property in connection with which it has been used. Macmahan
Pharmacal, 113 F. at 474-75. It was only with the recognition that a trademark is not only a
signifier of a "source" but also (i) an indication of consistent quality (the guarantee function) and
(ii) an important means of advertising, that courts have adopted the more liberal approach that
recognizes the transfer or use of a trademark so long as control over the nature of the product is
exercised. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1969). This liberal view
was fully adopted by section 10 of the Lanham Act, which provides that a valid transfer of a mark
does not require the transfer of any physical or tangible assets but rather the goodwill to which
the mark pertains. Trademark (Lanham) Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1946); see also Visa,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
51 PepsiCo, Inc., 416 F.2d at 289; see also Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.
1984) ("Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different goodwill and different
product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who reasonably assume that the mark
signifies the same thing ....
");Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River Corp., 997 F.2d 359 (7th
Cir. 1993); Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 366-67.
52 Visa, 696 F.2d 1371; Marshak, 746 F.2d at 930; Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers,
Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 906 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[T]he test is ... whether the new product is so
different from the old that to allow continued use of the mark would 'work a deception upon the
public."'); Midlothian Labs., L.L.C. v. Pamlab, L.L.C., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1077 (M.D. Ala.
2007) ("[C]ourts have repeatedly held that some variation in a product sold under a trademark is
inevitable, 'necessitated by trade discoveries, newer and more economical methods of making the
same product, or changed manufacturing conditions ... '). The Midlothian Labs court also
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may in actuality be very small. In one case, for example, a producer
changed the formula of a perfume that was touted for being made under
a "secret formula" that was passed from father to son. The change,
however, was so insubstantial that even an expert could not distinguish
between the two perfumes. Still, the court found that affixing the same
mark to the new perfume was fraudulent because the public learned to
associate the mark with a "secret formula" that the trademark owner
53
changed.
1.

Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman

An early case that involves both a transfer of rights and a change in
a product's attributes was Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman,
where a dispute arose over the ownership of the fanciful mark "Solar"
for baking powder. 54 Baking powders, it should be noted, were usually
advertised as containing alum, phosphate, or cream of tartar (the latter
being a byproduct of winemaking). 55 Plaintiff, Independent Baking
Powder (IBP), obtained an assignment for the mark "Solar," which was
used in connection with an alum baking powder. The defendant,
another baking powder company, attacked the assignment on two
grounds. First, it argued that the transfer was invalid because the
assignor neither transferred the business nor its goodwill. 56 Second, it
claimed that even if the assignment was valid, IBP lost its rights in the
fanciful mark "Solar" when it substituted the component alum for
phosphate. In accepting both arguments, the court noted:
A phosphate powder is a different powder, and whether better or
worse than a cream of tartar or an alum powder is wholly immaterial.
Counsel for the complainant argues that the substitution in
question resulted in an improved baking powder; but that is not the
point. It resulted in the production of a different powder made under
a materially different formula.... The trade-mark in question was
not acquired in connection with baking powder in general, but with
baking powder of a particular kind, apart from which its use is

noted that instances in which a trademark has been abandoned have involved cases in which
changes in the product resulted "in a 'wholly different product which is palmed off on the
public .... ' Id.
53 Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1930). Muelhens is
discussed infra Part II.D.2.
54 175 F. 448 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910).
55 Id. at 454; see also Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). Cream of
tartar (also known as potassium bitartrate or potassium hydrogen tartrate) crystallizes naturally in
wine casks during the fermentation of grape juice. See, e.g., Wines.com Wine Encyclopedia,
http://www.wines.com/wine encyclopedia/potassium-bitartrate.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
56 Assignor kept its business and continued to manufacture the same powder and sell it under
different marks. Id. at 451.
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57

unjustifiable.
Although in the abandonment context, IndependentBaking Powder
stands for the proposition that a trademark--even a fanciful one such as
SOLAR-may be used by its owner as a medium to misrepresent the
nature of the product to which the mark is affixed, it recognizes that a
fraud will be committed if a mark, which the public has learned to
associate with one type of baking powder, is used in connection with
58
another.
2.

Muihens & Kropffv. FerdMuelhens

Another case which involves a fanciful mark that had acquired a
"secondary descriptive meaning" is Mulhens & Kropff Inc. v. Ferd
Muelhens, Inc. 59 The Muelhens family had been manufacturing a
perfume in the city of Cologne, Germany since 1792. The perfume was
manufactured under a secret formula and was marketed under the
fanciful mark "4711." The fact that the formula was kept secret was
stated on all of its labels, and the public learned to associate the fanciful
mark with the secret formula. In 1889, the Muelhens established the
plaintiff, an American corporation, in order to market the "4711"
perfume in the United States. The agreement gave the American branch
57 Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
58 It should be mentioned that contrary to the decision in Independent, some courts have
focused not on the change in ingredients, formulae, or characteristics of the product to which a
mark is affixed, but rather on its overall performance. Thus, where the assigned mark was used
with an altered product, which was of the same or improved quality, such a use was not found to
act as an abandonment. In Royal Milling Co. v. J. F. Imbs Milling Co., 44 App. D.C. 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1915), for example, the court found that the assignee's use of the fanciful mark "Rex" in
connection with flour made from hard wheat was not fraudulent, although "Rex" was originally
used on flour made from soft wheat and although the court conceded that the two types of wheat
may be different. The court explained that because the flour was made of the "same grade" as
before, "there has been no misrepresentation in its use" and thus "no fraud." Id. at 209; see also
Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 F. 834 (D.N.J. 1924). But see Bambu Sales, Inc.
v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (adopting the distinction
suggested by 3 CALLMANN, supra note 3, § 20:45, between unique goods and fungible goods):
If the goods are unique (for example, made under a patent or secret formula, or by an
enterprise of established tradition such as the porcelain manufacturers of Limoges or
Copenhagen), "the provenance of the article is a value in and of itself. ..";"... the
public wants only the 'genuine' article." Under such circumstances, assignment of the
mark without the business it symbolizes creates a high likelihood of consumer
deception. With respect to fungibles, however, goods that are "familiar to all and can
be produced by many under varying trademarks," "[t]he public is no longer concerned
with the ...origin of the article. The article itself is what the buyer wants and will
continue to buy so long as it satisfies consumer demand, and until another article,
better advertised or more effective, replaces it.
Id. (citations omitted).
59 38 F.2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 881
(1930).
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the right to register the fanciful trademark "4711" in the United States.
The ownership in the secret recipe, however, remained in the hands of
the Muelhens family, who supplied the American branch with prepared
essences from Cologne. Shortly after the United States entered World
War I, shipments of the perfume from Nazi Germany stopped and the
Alien Property Custodian seized the Muelhens' rights in the American
branch and resold them. The purchaser continued to use the mark
"4711" in connection with a new perfume that was "closely similar but
...not

identical" to that prepared by the Muelhens. 60 After the end of

the war, the Muelhens family resumed its activities in the United States
and started selling its original perfume under the original name "4711."
A lawsuit followed. The district court found in favor of the American
branch. The court acknowledged that the fanciful mark "4711" had
gained a secondary descriptive meaning in the mind of the public as
"indicat[ing] an article manufactured in accordance with a secret
recipe. '61 Yet, it held that the American branch could nevertheless affix
the "4711" mark to its imitation perfume, explaining that the two
perfumes were substantially similar. To avoid confusion, the court
ordered that the mark be accompanied by a conspicuous statement that
"the product is not manufactured in accordance with the original secret
recipe owned by the House of Muelhens. ' '62
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It first
recognized that the fanciful mark "4711" meant two things: (1) "[o]rigin
in the house of Muelhens," which is a source of manufacture-a
secondary meaning; 63 and (2) "manufacture under a secret recipe,"
which is a quality-a secondary descriptive meaning. 64 The latter
secondary descriptive meaning was gained due to "the long continued
representations.., that any cologne bearing said mark was made
according to said original recipe. ' 65 The court of appeals then
concluded that neither plaintiff nor defendant could use the mark
because in either case a fraud would be committed upon the public as to
one of the aforementioned secondary meanings:

60 Id. at 291.
61 Id. at 293.
62 Id. at 297. The result was that the fanciful mark "4711," which was associated by the
public with a secret formula, was accompanied by a qualifying statement that declared the
opposite. Id. at 298; cf In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., No. 75/664,835, 2002 WL 523343
(T.T.A.B. 2002) (finding the mark "Super Silk" for a fabric not made of silk deceiving and
rejecting the applicant's contentions that explanatory statements in advertising or labels "which
purchasers may or may not note" negate the deception).
63 I use the term "secondary meaning" in a broad way to refer to any type of term (not just
descriptive) that denotes to the public a source of sale or manufacture (i.e., serves an inter-brand

function).
64 Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1930).
65 Id.
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Plaintiff [the American branch] has succeeded to Muelhens' business
in [the United States], which would entitle plaintiff to use the mark
in its first meaning [origin]. It has not succeeded to Muelhens'
ownership of the recipe, and therefore may not truthfully use the
second [descriptive] meaning [i.e., manufactured according to a
secret formula]. The defendant, on the other hand, if allowed to use
the mark, will truthfully represent the quality of its article, but will
66
misrepresent that it is continuing [the] American business.

3.

Grills v. Miller

The facts of Grills v. Miller6 7 are similar to that of Muelhens. In
both, a fanciful trademark gained two "secondary meanings": one with
regard to the product's attribute and the other with regard to its source.
In both cases, neither party could use the mark without deceiving the
public as to one of these meanings. Grills was the exclusive distributor
of Miller's skin cream. Grills had no knowledge of the cream's formula
and had never manufactured the cream. With Miller's consent, Grills
changed the name of the product to "Sealskin" and launched an
extensive advertising campaign to introduce the new name. The issue
before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was who owned the
mark "Sealskin": (1) the plaintiff who sold "Sealskin" products and
became identified by the trademark as the source of sale, but did not
know the formula and thus could not manufacture "Sealskin" creams; or
(2) the defendant who manufactured the creams, but was not associated
by the public with the mark? The court answered that neither party
owned the mark because any use by either party "would be a deceptive
use of the trade mark" 68 :
[Plaintiff, Grills] could not use [the mark] ... without also...
sanctioning the false implication that the goods were those that he
had formerly sold under the same trade mark .... On the other
hand, since the trade mark 'Sealskin' has become associated with the
plaintiff as the seller as well as with the product itself, it would be
unfair... to allow the defendant [Miller]... to use the name on his
66 Id. Judge Learned Hand dissented but has agreed on this point: "However, so far as
applied to cologne, made under the recipe, the mark meant more. It had for so long been
associated with declarations that the cologne was made under the recipe, that two meanings had
coalesced; these were, (1) 'emanating from the old source,' (2) 'made under the old recipe.' The
plaintiff could truthfully say the first; it could not say the second; in fact it said both. But when
the defendant came into the market and sold cologne made under the recipe but by Muhlens, it
made the same representations, and the first was untrue, while the second was true." Id. at 940.
Judge Learned Hand even went further to say that the secondary descriptive meaning with regard
to the secret formula was the dominant one: "Customers presumably cared nothing about the
place where the cologne was made up, and much about the essence." Id.
67 75 N.E.2d 737 (Mass. 1947).
68 Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
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product, because its use would tend to palm off the defendant's

goods as goods sold by the plaintiff .... 69
As in Muelhens, none of the parties could use the mark without
deceiving the public with regard to one of the two "secondary
meanings" the product had acquired. The importance of these cases is
their recognition that a mark, even a fanciful one, may have an
informational or descriptive value. It may denote an attribute,
ingredient, formula, or process and, if so, it may serve as a medium for
intra-brand false advertising. For historical reasons, however, the courts
in interpreting section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act have failed to follow the same
reasoning.
III.
A.

FALSE ADVERTISING

The Law Priorto the Lanham Act

Although the branch of unfair competition stemmed from the tort
of fraud, the early cases in the field of false advertising regarded the
concept of unfair competition as limited to cases of passing-off the
defendant's goods as the plaintiffs (or, put differently, limited to interbrand settings). Thus, even when a manufacturer deceived its
consumers and sold its products while affirmatively and descriptively

claiming that the products were made of a substance or possessed a
certain quality that they did not, such a behavior did not give rise to a
private cause of action. If, however, in addition to defrauding the public
the unscrupulous manufacturer also attempted to free ride on one of its
competitor's reputation and pass-off its products, then-and only

then--did a cause of action arise.

1.

American Washboardand the Inter-Brand Restriction

This is well illustrated by the line of cases beginning with
American Washboard v. Saginaw Manufacturing, where the court

refused to enjoin the defendant from representing its zinc washboards as
made of aluminum. 70 The plaintiff, American Washboard, was the first
69 Id.

70 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900); see also N.Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F.
277 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1890) (finding defendant sold its cement elsewhere as "Rosendale Cement"
although it was not manufactured in the locality of Rosendale). Although the court noted that
"[n]o doubt the sale of spurious goods, or holding them out to be different from what they are, is
a great evil, and an immoral ... act," it nonetheless held that absent passing-off there is no cause
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to manufacture and sell washboards made of aluminum in the United
States. Aware of the allure of aluminum as an ingredient, the defendant

began advertising its own zinc washboard as "made of aluminum" and
even sold them under the mark "Aluminum."' 71 The plaintiff's
complaint raised only a false advertising claim (not passing-off). 72 It
argued that "being... branded with the word 'Aluminum,' and so
advertised, purchasers and users [were] induced to believe that the
73
rubbing sheet [was] made of aluminum" and were thus misled.

Despite the unequivocal affirmative and descriptive false and
misleading advertising, the Washboard court dismissed the complaint.
The court explained that "the private right of action in such cases is not
based upon fraud or imposition upon the public" and that it is "not for
74
the benefit of the public, although that may be its incidental effect.

Rather it "is maintained solely for the protection of the property rights
of [the trademark owner]."' 75 Thus, the court concluded that "only
where the defendant ...is palming-off his goods" does a cause of
action arise. 76 Because the defendant in Washboard did not pass-off its

product as the plaintiffs (the defendant sold its products as its own), but
rather was "just" committing a fraud on the public (misrepresenting its
zinc boards as being made of aluminum), the court dismissed the case.
Aware of the unsatisfactory outcome, the court noted that if Congress
wished to suppress such "moral wrongs," it could do so by public
77
prosecution of the offenders.
American Washboard gave swindlers carte blanche to misrepresent

of action. Id. at 278-79.
71 The defendant also made its zinc boards in the same shape and size of the plaintiff's
aluminum washboards. Am. Washboard, 103 F. at 283.
72 Id. at 282 ("It may be stated at the outset that the case is not one for the protection of a
trade-mark .... Indeed, we do not understand that the learned counsel who represents appellant
in this case makes any claim that his client is entitled to protection upon the ground that it has
adopted the word 'Aluminum' as a technical trade-mark. In the brief for appellant it is stated that
the case is one of unlawful competition in trade, and it has been argued upon that basis.").
73 Id. at 283, 284-85 ("The bill is not predicated upon that theory [palming off].... [T]he
theory of the case seems to be that complainant, manufacturing a genuine aluminum board, has a
right to enjoin others from branding any board 'Aluminum' not so in fact, although there is no
[passing-off.]").
74 Id. at 284, 285 (emphases added).
75 Id. at 285.
76 Id. at 284 ("The case at bar cannot be sustained as one to restrain unfair trade. Relief in
such cases is granted only where the defendant.. . [is] palming-off his goods.., to the injury of
the plaintiff." (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear India-Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear
Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 604)).
77 Id. at 285 ("It is doubtless morally wrong and improper to impose upon the public by the
sale of spurious goods, but this does not give rise to a private right of action unless the property
rights of the plaintiff are thereby invaded. There are many wrongs which can only be righted
through public prosecution, and for which the legislature, and not the courts, must provide a
remedy."); see also N.Y & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277, 278-79 (C.C.E.D.
Penn. 1890) (suggesting that congress take action by enabling public prosecution of those who
defraud the public); infra notes 78 and 82.

350

CARDOZO LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 31:2

their own products and engage in intra-brand fraud. Consumers could
not detect the fraud themselves because the subject of the fraud was a
credence quality (could you distinguish between zinc and aluminum?);
thus, they could not sue under the tort of fraud. Producers, because of
American Washboard,did not have a cause of action absent passing-off
(inter-brand fraud). The result was a license to cheat.
2.

FTC v. Winsted Hosiery

It took fourteen years after the Washboarddecision for Congress to
take action. In 1914, Congress, following American Washboard's call
for a legislative change, enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA), 78 which in section 5 declared unlawful "unfair methods of
competition. ' 79 Its scope, however, is limited in nature. The FTCA
does not provide the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with the
authority to order the trademark owner to compensate its consumers,
nor does it provide consumers (or competitors) with a private cause of
80
action.
One of the first tests of the FTCA was in FTC v. Winsted Hosiery
Co. 81 Interestingly, the facts in Winsted were very similar to a
hypothetical discussed twenty-two years earlier by the American
Washboard court, where Judge Day held that if a seller advertises its
goods as being manufactured entirely of wool when in fact they are not,
no private cause of action arises. 82 In Winsted, the issue was whether a
manufacturer could brand its products as "Natural Merino" or "Natural
Wool" when in fact they were composed only partly of wool or merino.
The FTC ordered the defendant to stop using the terms "Merino" and

78 See Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC., 281 F. 744, 752 (2d Cir. 1922) ("The above case [a
hypothetical mentioned in American Washboard that suggested that where a seller misrepresents
that its own goods are made of pure wool when they are not there is no cause of action] illustrates
one of the reasons which led Congress to enact the statute creating the Federal Trade
Commission, and making unfair methods of competition unlawful, and empowering the
commission to put an end to them. By that statute the identical situation which the court in the
above case said it was beyond its power to suppress has been brought within the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission . .
79 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
80 Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 561 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Alfred Dunhill
Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)); Mouradian v. John Hancock Cos.,
751 F. Supp. 262, 267 (D. Mass. 1988) ("[T]here is no private right of action under the
FTCA ....); Royal Baking Powder Co., 281 F. at 745-46.
81 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
82 Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1900) ("Can it be that
a dealer who should make such articles only of pure wool could... [ask] the courts to suppress
the trade and business of all persons whose goods may deceive the public? We find no such
authority in the books, and are clear in the opinion that, if the doctrine is to be thus
extended... the remedy must come from the legislature, and not from the courts.").
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"Wool." After the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
the Supreme Court reinstated the FTC's order on appeal. Justice
Brandeis held that false advertising constitutes an unfair method of
competition and that the new FTCA authorizes the commission to order
anyone who misrepresents the quality of his goods in his advertising to
83
cease from so doing.
In the post-FTCA world, then, the situation was such that an interbrand confusion (passing-off) gave rise to a private cause of action,
while an intra-brand fraud (fraud committed by a seller with regard to
its own good) only subjected the seller to a cease-and-desist order
issued by the FTC. The FTC further limited its own authority by
prosecuting false advertising caused only by descriptive or
misdescriptive marks. In these cases, the FTC ordered the complete
excision of the mark where it found that a qualifying clause would not
be able to cure the deception.8 4 Where, however, the destruction of a
mark could have been avoided by less drastic means (such as the use of
qualifying language to prevent consumer confusion), the complete
85
excision of the name was not ordered.

83 Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494.
84 See, e.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (enjoining lumber suppliers
from marketing forest products under the trade names "California White Pine" when they were
biologically made from a yellow pine-a less desirable wood); FTC v. Kay, 35 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.
1979) (ordering the excision of the mark "Kay-Radium" after the court found that the product
contained no radium); El Moro Cigar Co. v. FTC, 107 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1939) (ordering the
excision of the term "Havana Counts" for cigars made entirely of domestic tobacco); Marietta
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1931) (excising the term "Sani-Onyx, a Vitreous Marble,"
because the product was made of neither marble nor onyx); Masland Duraleather Co. v. FTC, 34
F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1920) (excising the term "Duraleather," because the product was not made of
leather). Another line of cases in which courts denied the use of trademarks that included the
term "hide" or "hyde" for non-leather products is that of the Neumann cases. See R. Neumann &
Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1964); R. Neumann & Co. v. Bon-Ton
Auto Upholstery, Inc., 326 F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also Cont'l Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330
F.2d 475 (2nd Cir. 1964) (ordering the deletion of the words "six months" from the trade name
"Continental Six Month Floor Wax" after determining that the petitioner's floor wax could not
last that long); Gold Tone Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950) (upholding the
complete excision of the term "Gold Tone Studios," because the studio did not employ gold tone
photographic processing).
85 See generally Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) (reversing a decree ordering
the complete excision of the trade name "Alpacuna" for coats containing alpaca, mohair, wool,
and cotton but no vicuna); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that
the term "Cashmora" for sweaters containing a blend of fibers consisting of Angora and wool but
no cashmere can be accompanied by the legend "contains no cashmere"); In re Country Tweeds,
Inc., 50 F.T.C. 470, 475 (F.T.C. 1953) (finding the term "Kashmoor" for coats containing no
cashmere to be misleading unless accompanied by "words ... which clearly and conspicuously
disclose that such coats contain no cashmere"); Bear Mill Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 98 F.2d 67, 69 (2d
Cir. 1938) (ordering that the terms "Mill" and "Manufacturing" be accompanied by the
qualification "Converters, Not Manufacturers of Textiles").
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Royal Baking Powder and Ely-Norris Safe

So rooted was the view that acts which cause intra-brand confusion
are not actionable that only six days after the Winsted Hosiery decision,
in Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, the petitioner (relying on
American Washboard) boldly argued that "no statute or decided case
has declared that a manufacturer or traderowes to his competitors the
duty of refrainingfrom misrepresentationof the quality or ingredients
of his own goods, and that, on the contrary,it has been firmly held that
'86
no such duty exists."

For a period of sixty-six years (1853-1919) the Royal Baking
Company (RBC) and its predecessors had marketed and advertised "Dr.
Price's Cream Baking Powder" exclusively as a cream of tartar baking
powder. For thirty-five years it warned the public against the use of
phosphate baking powders, denouncing them as dangerous and
unwholesome. In 1919, however, RBC changed "Dr. Price's Cream
Baking Powder" to nothing less than a phosphate powder. Yet, it
continued to use all of the distinctive features of the old cream of tartar
labels, "including the name 'Dr. Price's,' which had been advertised for
many years as denoting exclusively a cream of tartar powder and not a
phosphate powder. ' 87 The Commission found RBC's use of the mark
"Dr. Price" on a phosphate baking powder to be false and misleading.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the
novelty of the case lies in the fact that RBC passed-off "one of [its]
products for another of [its] own products. 88 The Royal Baking case

takes the Winsted Hosiery decision one step further in that it recognizes
that a fanciful mark-the term "Dr. Price" 89-- can, through advertising,
acquire a secondary descriptive meaning that may be used by a seller to
misrepresent its own product. It recognizes a cause of action for intrabrand fraud:
The method of advertising adopted by the Royal Baking Powder
Company to sell under the name of Dr. Price's Cream Baking
Powder an inferior powder, on the strength of the reputation attained

through 60 years of its manufacture and sale and wide advertising of
its superior powder, under an impression induced by its
86 281 F. 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1922) (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 748.
88 Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 748. Although the term "Dr. Price" was part of the legend "Dr. Price Baking
Powder," the court emphasized the former term as acquiring a secondary descriptive meaning:
"[I]t had decided to change its well-known Dr. Price brand from a cream of tartar powder to a
straight phosphate baking powder .... [And] the name 'Dr. Price's,' which had been advertised
for many years as denoting exclusively a cream of tartar powder and not a phosphate powder."

Id.
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advertisements that the product purchased was the same in kind and

as superior as that which had been so long manufactured by it, was
unfair alike to the public and to the competitors in the baking powder
business.

90

The Royal Baking holding, however, is limited. It only stands for
the proposition that misrepresentation of a fanciful mark by its owner
can give rise to injunctive relief based on the FTC's authority to order
the excision of a deceitful mark. Unfortunately, the Royal Baking
holding was interpreted narrowly as applying to descriptive marks only
rather than to fanciful ones, apparently based on the legend "Cream
Baking Powder," which accompanied the term "Dr. Price." 9 1
The limited concept that only inter-brand confusion is actionable
was attacked again by Judge Learned Hand in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v.
Mosler Safe Co., where the plaintiff, the exclusive maker of safes
containing an explosion chamber, sued the defendant for falsely
representing that its safes also contained an explosion chamber. 92 The
defendant did not try to pass-off its product as the plaintiffs. Its safes
bore its own name and address, and it was found as a matter of fact that
"the defendant never gave any customer [a] reason to believe that its
safes were of the plaintiffs make. ' 93 The question before the court was
of an intra-brand nature: Can the defendant mislead the public as to an
attribute of its own product? Although Judge Hand rejected the
plaintiff s reliance on Winsted and Royal Baking Powder, noting that in
those cases the cause of action was predicated on the FTCA, he was
willing to reconsider the holding of the Washboard court, under which,
as he conceded, the law would be with the fraudulent. 94 After noting
that "what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25 years ago [in
American Washboard] may have become such," the court held that it is
"unlawful to lie about the quality of one's wares," and that this outcome
is "merely a corollary of Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery
90 Id. at 753.
91 See IA CALLMANN, supra note 3, § 5:11. The author is of the opinion that only descriptive
(or misdescriptive) marks can serve as a medium for false advertising. Id.; see also Annual
Report of the FTC for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922, at 27, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/arl922.pdf ("[T]he advertisements employed tended to
create the belief on the part of the public that the new powder which the Royal Co. was placing
on the market was in fact Price's Baking Powder, which had been well known for 60 years as a
cream of tartar powder, and tended to conceal or obscure the fact that it was a radically different
powder."). But see Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216
(1931).
92 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925).
93 Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132, 133 (1927). On appeal, the
Supreme Court noted, "[t]he plaintiff admitted that the defendant's safes bore the defendant's
name and address and that the defendant never gave any customer reason to believe that its safes
were of the plaintiff's make." Id. at 132-33.
94 Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d at 603-04.
The District Court, following American
Washboard, held that these representations did not give a private cause of action. Id. at 603.
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CO." 95 In other words, Judge Learned Hand remedied the asymmetry
caused by the line of cases beginning with American Washboard,where
inter-brand confusion (passing-off) gave rise to a private cause of
action, whereas intra-brand confusion (where a seller misrepresents the
nature of its own goods) did not. Judge Hand's decision, however, was
96
reversed.
B.

The Enactment of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

The enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 was a turning point in
the treatment of the law. 97 It marked a change from a producerprotecting regime to one which recognizes that both consumers and
producers alike are the victims of false advertising. 98 The change,
however, was gradual and incomplete. While in the early days of the
Lanham Act some courts had expressed the idea that passing-off was
still essential to any recovery under section 43(a), 99 it was soon accepted
that the scope of section 43(a) was indeed wider.10 0 Gradually, a private
remedy was recognized against a trademark owner who had used its
own mark to falsely mischaracterize the nature, characteristics, or
origins of its own goods. The private remedy was limited, however, to
descriptive marks only.
One early case in which a court interpreted section 43(a) to apply

95 Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
96 Mosler Safe Co., 273 U.S. at 134. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
plaintiff could not show loss of customers, noting that even if "the representation was false...
there is nothing to show that customers had they known the facts would have gone to the plaintiff
" Id.
rather than to other competitors in the market ....
97 Section 43(a) provided:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation
of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or
used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be
liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946).
98 U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartan Inc., 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982); Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Protecting consumers from false or misleading
advertising, moreover, is an important goal of the statute and a laudable public policy to be
served.").
99 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951); Samson Crane Co.
v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949).
100 L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
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in an intra-brand setting is Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks,' 0 where the plaintiff
sought to register its trademark "Glass Wax" in connection with a liquid
for cleaning glass that contained no wax. The defendant opposed the
application on the ground that the Gold Seal Company used its mark to
falsely describe its goods in violation of section 43(a).10 2 Although the
court denied the claim on the ground that no damages were established,
it nevertheless rejected Gold's contention that section 43(a) did not
apply.
Similarly, courts have found that: affixing the mark "Polysapphire"
to a product containing no sapphires constitutes false advertising; 0 3 the
mark "Gelatin Snacks" is false and misleading if attached to a product
that does not contain gelatin; 10 4 and the mark "Syrup of Figs" is
deceptive if fig syrup is not a substantial ingredient of the product. 0 5 In
Abbott Labs v. Mead Johnson & Co., the Seventh Circuit determined
that the use of the mark "Ricelyte" violated section 43(a)(1)(B) of the
Lanham Act because it falsely advertised that the product contained rice
when in fact it did not. 10 6 In all of these cases, however, the marks were
descriptive.10 7 As the Dunhill decision demonstrates, the courts

declined to extend the "false advertising" prong of section 43(a) to nondescriptive terms.

101129 F. Supp.

928 (D.D.C. 1955).
102 Id. at 931,938.
103 See Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1988).
104 Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Del Monte Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
105 Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903) (refusing to protect
the mark "Syrup of Figs" under the doctrine of unclean hands because fig syrup was not a
substantial ingredient of the product). But see Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143,
146 (1920) (continued use of the mark "Coca-Cola" after the elimination of cocaine from the
plaintiffs product was not misleading to preclude relief against infringement because "Coca
Cola" has come to denote a soda drink "rather than a compound of particular substances" and
because the mark owner informed consumers that it no longer used cocaine in the product's
formulation).
106 971 F.2d 6, 14 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the mark "Ricelyte" was literally false because
the product contained "rice syrup solids, which are not a 'part' of rice or rice carbohydrates, but
rather a completely different carbohydrate, both structurally and functionally").
107 See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 97 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[The
trademark "BreathAsure"] falsely tells the consumer that he or she has the assurance of fresher
breath when ingesting one of the defendant's capsules. That is not true."); Novartis Consumer
Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 (3d
Cir. 2002) ("As in BreathAsure and Cuisinarts, the product name Mylanta, 'Night Time
Strength,' necessarily implies a false message: it falsely represents that it possesses a quality that
is particularly efficacious for those suffering from heartburn at night. But that is not true.");
Potato Chip Inst. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 173 (D. Neb. 1971) (labeling a product
fashioned from dried potato granules, instead of sliced raw potatoes, as "Potato Chips" falsely
described the product absent a declaration that the product is made of potato granule).
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Alfred Dunhill v. Interstate Cigar

Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co. represents a major
setback in the development of section 43(a) jurisprudence. 108 In
Dunhill, the court refused to extend section 43(a) to enjoin sales of
damaged salvaged goods bearing the mark "Dunhill," notwithstanding
the possibility that consumers would be misled into believing that they
were Dunhill's usual high-quality products.10 9
Dunhill was the exclusive distributor in the United States of
tobacco products manufactured by Alfred Dunhill Limited, a British
corporation. After receiving a container that was damaged by water,
Dunhill permitted its insurer to sell the tobacco as salvaged. It then
contacted the purchaser, Interstate Cigar, and demanded that it mark the
1 10
tins as salvaged (the damage was not visible to the naked eye).
Interstate refused and sold the tobacco without advising consumers that
the tobacco was salvaged and had been subject to possible water
damage. The result was that the consumers who wanted to purchase
high-quality Dunhill tobacco were deceived into purchasing damaged
tobacco. A lawsuit followed. The District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that Interstate Cigar violated section 43(a)
when it resold the Dunhill brand without removing the "Dunhill" labels
or without affixing a warning to each of the tins:
[D]efendants have falsely represented the quality of the salvaged
tobacco in violation of Section 1125(a). Sales of damaged tobacco in
tins bearing trademarks associated with high quality tobacco
["Dunhill"], without adequate warnings to customers that the goods
are damaged, involve false representations of their quality.
False representations can be the product of affirmatively
misleading statements, of partially correct statements or failure to
disclose materialfacts. The public can be as easily misled by the
purchase of damaged goods in their original containers which the
purchasers do not know are damaged as they can be by statements
that the goods are not damaged. 11
108 364 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
109 Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974). Dunhill has been
recently cited with consent by the Supreme Court in DastarCorp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003), for the proposition that "§ 43(a) does not have boundless
application as a remedy for unfair trade practices." See also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing Dunhill on the grounds that in
Dunhill there "was no false representation in the sense contemplated by the Lanham Act" because
"the goods sold were Dunhill goods").
110 Dunhill, 364 F. Supp. at 371 ("[E]ven if a tin is still airtight or there is no visible rust on the
outside of the tin, there can still be some rusting on the inside ....
It is, therefore, impossible to
determine whether the tobacco itself in any particular can has been damaged without opening
each tin.").
111 Id. at 372 (emphases added). The court made it clear that the cause of action arises under
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
It relied on the fact that "Interstate never affixed to Dunhill containers
false descriptions or representations or even used such descriptions or
representations in connection with the sale of Dunhill tobacco products"
in determining that no cause of action could arise.1 12 The court of
appeals explained that the district court, in reaching its decision
wrongly, "merged" the Lanham Act with section 5 of the FTCA. I3 The
court noted that unlike the FTCA, which authorizes the FTC to require
sellers to make affirmative disclosures in order to prevent consumer
deception, no such affirmative action is mandated under the Lanham
Act.1 14 Thus, it arrived at the following conclusion:
Even if this court were to accept the judgment of the District Court
that Interstate has engaged in an unfair trade practice by not
relabeling the tobacco tins, neither the Federal Trade Commission
Act nor the Lanham Act provides relief for Dunhill under the
circumstances. Not every possible evil has yet been proscribed by
15
federal law.1

In the court's view, section 43(a) "is limited to false advertising as
that term is generally understood," and that term does not include a nondescriptive mark in its ambit. 116 Finally, the court of appeals noted that
Dunhill could not present itself as a "victim" of a false advertising
practice, because Dunhill could have conditioned the sale of its tobacco
to Interstate Cigar on the latter's promise to make affirmative claims
7
when selling the salvaged goods.'l

the "false advertisement" prong of section 43 noting, "[t]his is not a case in which plaintiffs allege
that defendants have reproduced or copied a registered mark. Therefore, there can be no violation
of Section 1114 [trademark infringement]." Id. at 371. It then granted an injunction prohibiting
Interstate from selling the Salvaged Dunhill brand "without taking effective steps to warn their
customers that the tobacco has been subjected to possible water damage." Id. at 374.
112 Dunhill,499 F.2d at 235-36.
113 Id. at 237 ("[The lower] court reached its result by reading the Lanham Act in conjunction
with 'unfair and deceptive trade practice' provisions of the Federal Trade Commission
Act ... ").
114 Id.
115 Id. (emphasis added).
116 Id. ("The [FTCA] does not give competitors the right to sue for unfair advertising and the
Lanham Act does not give anyone the right to sue for acts which constitute deceptive trade
practices but which do not constitute unfair advertising.").
117 See id. at 238 ("[Dunhill presents] a very poor claim as victim of an unfair or deceptive
trade practice [because] [t]his is not a case ... where the defendant acquired plaintiff's rejected
merchandise from unknown third parties and then affirmatively touted it as first quality. Rather,
Interstate acquired the tobacco from Dunhill.. .which had voluntarily relinquished title...
without attaching any conditions to their resale, and sold the tobacco ... without making any
affirmative claims.., that these were first quality goods." (citations omitted)).
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THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE LANHAM ACT

A.

Dunhill Revisited

The Dunhill holding missed the heart of the issue. The purpose of
the Lanham Act and section 43(a) in particular, as was interpreted in
Gold Seal, was to protect the consuming public. It provided a
competitor with a private cause of action because the latter has the
knowledge and resources to detect the fraud and, thus, can act as the
public's avenger. 1 8 The fraudulent behavior of Interstate Cigar caused
damage to both the public and Dunhill. Refusing Dunhill's request
thus left consumers with no relief. The decision seems to be predicated
on the lack of inter-brand confusion: Since consumers were not
confused with regard to the source of the product-the salvaged tobacco
cans were indeed Dunhill's-there was no place for relief. In so doing,
the court focused only on the trademark's inter-brandfunction as a
source identifier. It failed to recognize the intra-brandfunction: that a
mark can function as a medium for false advertising. The sale of the
salvaged tobacco without a warning as to possible damage is
tantamount to a misrepresentation of its quality and nature.
Furthermore, it seems that if Dunhill itself would have begun to
continuously sell salvaged tobacco under its own trademark, such an act
would be found as an abandonment and would act as a forfeiture. The
same rationale should have led the court to issue an injunction.
The focus of the court on the contractual relation is also misplaced.
It revitalized the pre-section 43(a) "property-theory" (pressed in
American Washboard) which dominated the law of unfair competition
and ignored the damage to the consuming public. Indeed, a mark is not
merely private property which inures to the benefits of its owner; it is
also cumulative capital. 1 9
When a mark acquires a secondary
descriptive meaning such that the public associates it with a certain
attribute or quality, it announces, affirmatively, to the public: "I denote
a certain taste, process, or ingredient." Given the negative externality
imposed on the consuming public, a contract between two or more
118 Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Protecting
consumers from false or misleading advertising, moreover, is an important goal of the statute and
a laudable public policy to be served ....
[C]ompetitors have the greatest interest in stopping
misleading advertising, and a private cause of action under section 43(a) allows those parties with
the greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest resources to devote
to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously. Public policy, therefore, is indeed well served by
permitting misrepresentation of quality claims to be actionable under section 43(a).").
119 See Malla Polak, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the
PublicDomain-With an Examplefrom the Trademark CounterfeitingAct of 1984, 14 CARDOZO

L. REv. 1392 (1993).
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parties should not have been determinative. It is for this very reason
that a naked contract to assign or a license in gross is deemed invalid. It
is the concern with regard to third parties-the consuming public-that
should have guided the court.
Dunhill was a turning point in the development of section 43(a)
jurisprudence. Later decisions following Dunhill gave a narrow
definition as to what may constitute "advertising," thereby excluding
non-descriptive marks from the ambit of section 43(a). 120 Many
required a statement to be affirmative as a prerequisite for finding a
section 43(a) violation, 2 1 while others focused on the contractual
relation (or lack thereof) between the trademark holder and the seller of
122
the branded goods.
In sum, prior to 1946, the law of false advertising was limited to
inter-brand settings. Its aim was to protect competitors, not consumers.
Hence, a fraud on the public was not actionable absent a showing of
120 The term "advertising" is not defined in the act. For decisions providing a narrow
interpretation see: Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.
1978); Z-TEL Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 565 (E.D. Tex.
2004); Ultra-Temp Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Sys., 27 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91-93 (D. Mass. 1998);
Mktg. Unlimited, Inc. v Munro, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1396, 1397-98 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Tube Alloy
Corp. v. Homco Int'l, Inc., No. 85-5829, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11966 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 1989);
Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
121 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125, interpretative note 90 (LexisNexis 2009) ("There is no duty
under § 43(a) of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a)) to make affirmative disclosures since,
failure to disclose material facts is not 'false representation."'); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1978); Brown v. Armstrong, 957 F. Supp. 1293,
1303 n.9 (D. Mass. 1997) ("There is support in the caselaw for the proposition that § 43(a)(1)(B)
only reaches affirmative misrepresentations."); Kienzle v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 774 F. Supp.
432, 438 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Tube Alloy Corp. v. Homco Int'l, Inc., No. 85-5829, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11966 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 1989); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1204, 1219 (E.D.N.Y 1981) ("[Section 43(a)] is concerned with affirmative misrepresentations
about the nature ... of goods a defendant has sold or offered or advertised for sale."); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1977); ANNE GILSON
LALONDE, 9-111-43 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1125 (LexisNexis 2007). But see Boshei Enters.
Co. v. PorteousFastener Co., 441 F. Supp. 162 (C.D. Cal. 1977), where the same court found
that an omission may give rise to a section 43(a) violation. In Boshei Enterprises, the plaintiff
alleged that defendants, importers of fasteners, in repackaging fasteners violated section 43 of the
Lanham Act by (a) the omission to mark the re-packaged fasteners with a label or designation of
the true country of origin thereby creating the false impression that the fasteners are made in the
United States; and (b) affirmatively creating the false impression that the fasteners are made in
the United States by marking their packages with the words "United States" or names of cities
within the United States. The court dismissed the defendants' claim that the holding of Dunhill
precludes an omission of a material fact from the reaches of the Lanham Act, holding that in
doing so the defendants "misread the ratio decidendi in Dunhill." Id. at 164. It held that "the law
of false representation must necessarily include the omission of the material fact of origin that
affirmatively says in the context in which fasteners are sold 'I am a product of the United
States."' Id. The court read Dunhill narrowly as holding that Dunhill was barred from turning to
trademark law to remedy its failure to limit the resale of its goods by contract. Id.
122 Analog Devices, Inc. v. W. Pac. Indus., No. 97-56329, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15416 (9th
Cir. July 8, 1998) (discussing Dunhill in the context of the first sale doctrine); 3M, Co. v. Rauh
Rubber, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1117, 1128-29 (D. Minn. 1996); United Brake Sys. v. Am. Envtl.
Prot., Inc., 963 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
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passing-off. This changed with the enactment of section 43(a). The
new provision allowed competitors to sue the unscrupulous seller that
used a descriptive legend to make an affirmative misrepresentation
regarding the nature of its own product. False advertising committed by
a failure to remove a non-descriptive mark, however, remained immune
from section 43(a).
B.

The 1988 Amendment

Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act as amended (effective
November 16, 1989) reads as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any [1] word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any [2] false
designation of origin, [3] false or misleading description of fact, or
[4] false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics,qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall
be liable in a civil action by any person123who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
The 1988 amendment has caused two main changes. First, by
providing that any person who "misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her" goods shall
be liable, Congress made it clear that section 43(a) applies to intrabrand as well as inter-brand settings. 24 Second, the restructured
language of section 43(a)(1)(B) makes it clear that any type of mark,
whether descriptive or not, can serve as a medium for false advertising.
This conclusion follows directly from the plain reading of the italicized
word "any" in the preamble and the language that follows the number
[1], which is part of the definition of a trademark. 125 Replacing that
language with the term "trademark," the preamble and section
43(a)(1)(B) would read as follows: Any person who.., uses in
commerce any trademark... which ... in commercial advertising...
123 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (emphases added).
124 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 27:25, 27-5 1.
125 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (LexisNexis 2009) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... used by a person.., to identify and distinguish
his or her goods.., and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
(emphasis added)).
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misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin
of his or her... goods ... shall be liable in a civil action.
This language does not differentiate between descriptive marks and
non-descriptive ones. It seems to be a departure from the pre-1988
interpretation. Surprisingly, this plain reading of the law was not
adopted. Instead, courts and commentators have divided the preamble
of section 43(a)(1) into four distinct categories. The first two categories
(the use of "any [1] word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof'--that is, a trademark; and the use of "any [2] false
designation of origin") are said to apply to subsection 43(a)(1)(A).
They provide a cause of action for infringement of a trade-name or an
unregistered trademark. 126 The last two categories (any "[3] false or
misleading description of fact" and any "[4] false or misleading
representation of fact") are said to apply to subsection 43(a)(1)(B).
They provide a private cause of action in the case of false advertising.
Thus, under the current interpretation, section 43(a) is read as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce:
[1] any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof [that is, a trademark], or [2] any false designation of origin,
false, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
[3] any misleading description of fact, or [4] any false or
misleading representation of fact, which (B) in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
127
damaged by such act.
126 For this reason, sections 32 and 43(a)(1)(A) are conditioned upon a finding of likelihood of
confusion. Thus, if one has used a trade name for its business or an unregistered mark to
designate its product, although the first, being a trade name is not registerable and the second has
not been registered with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the senior user of these terms
may bring a cause of action against a junior manufacturer that tries to pass-off its business or
products as the senior's.
127 See IA CALLMANN, supra note 3, § 5:5. In summarizing the elements of the false
advertising prong of section 43(a), Callmann notes:
[T]his section now provides that: "Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services .... uses in commerce ... any false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her ... goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."
Id.; see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 27:10, at 27-22, § 27:13, at 27-26, § 27:24, at 27-4546 (noting that the "new statute is divided into two subsections: part one relates to use of the
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This categorization is erroneous. If Congress so intended, it could
have drafted section 43(a) as it appears above. Congress, however, did
not do so. Moreover, by limiting the first category of the preamblethat of marks-to section 43(a)(1)(A), it follows that a mark cannot give
rise to a false advertising claim unless it is descriptive, in which case it
can be hosted under the auspices of section 43(a)(1)(B). This Article
argues that such an interpretation is not only not mandated by the law,
but also contradicts its purpose and language. A trademark, even a
fanciful one, can gain a descriptive value; and if so, it can be used to
mischaracterize one's products.
1.

PioneerLeimel Fabricsv. PaulRothman Industries

Almost twenty years after Dunhill, in PioneerLeimel Fabrics,Inc.
v. Paul Rothman Industries, Ltd., the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania missed a golden opportunity to change the
interpretation of section 43(a)(1)(B). 128 Pioneer manufactured fabric
under the marks "Softouch" and "ST" and sold it through its agent
Hughes. Similar to the facts in Dunhill, after a fire at Pioneer's plant
damaged its fabrics, Pioneer authorized its insurer to sell the salvaged
fabric. Learning its lesson from Dunhill, however, Pioneer conditioned
the sale on the purchaser's promise not to disclose that the fabric was
Pioneer's or to utilize Pioneer's marks in connection with the damaged
goods. After a chain of sales, the salvaged fabric ended up in the hands
of Nassimi, who stored the fabric at its own agent's warehouse. It so
happened that both Pioneer (the original manufacturer) and Nassimi (the
owner of the salvaged fabric) were using the same agent, Hughes.
Exploiting the fact that both Pioneer's new fabric and Nassimi's
salvaged fabric were stored under its roof, Hughes filled orders for new
Pioneer fabric with Nassimi's salvaged fabric. The salvaged fabric was
often delivered in Pioneer's original wrapping and its invoices used
Pioneer's stocking numbers and trademarks.
Although the sales to Pioneer's customers occurred during the
years 1986-89, the court predicated its holding on section 43(a) as
amended in 1989.129 The new version of section 43(a), however, did
statute as a vehicle for federal court assertion of unregistered trademark, tradename and trade
dress infringement claims, and part two relates to use of the statute as a vehicle for federal court
assertion of false advertising... claims" and stating the elements of each subsection as noted
above).
128 No. 87-2581, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4187 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1992).
129 The parties did not raise the issue of whether the 1988 amendment to section 43(a) is
retroactive. See Pioneer Leimel Fabrics, Inc. v. Paul Rothman Industries, Ltd., No. 87-2581,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10544 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1992); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 27:11 at
27-23 ("The Third Circuit has given the new version of § 43(a) retroactive effect.").
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not seem to impact the court's analysis. As in Dunhill, the court held
that the "unauthorized sale of Softouch, without more, would constitute
neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition."', 30 It also
adopted Dunhill's ill-based rationale, finding that absent contractual
obligations or affirmative misrepresentations, no cause of action can
arise under the amended section 43(a):
In Dunhill, the court reversed the trial court's finding that Section
1125(a) of the Lanham Act was violated by defendant's resale of
water-damaged tobacco with plaintiff's label but without warnings.
Plaintiff sold the tobacco without any resale conditions, and
defendant sold it without making any affirmative claims of first
quality. Here, Pioneer's sale of the Fabric to Rothman did contain
restrictions ....Nassimi

claims

it

made

"First

Quality"

representations to one customer only, but other sales were made to
customers who thought they were purchasing new goods from
Pioneer, not salvage from Nassimi ....131
It is unclear to what extent and importance the court gave to the
use of the mark "ST" in the invoices that accompanied the sold fabric.
Some statements of the court imply that it was willing to view the use of
Pioneer's mark on the invoices as a misrepresentation of the fabric's
properties on which customers were entitled to rely. 132 However, the
court's emphasis on the contractual restrictions and the affirmative
descriptive misrepresentations seem to be the pivotal ground for the
1 33
court's decision.
130 Pioneer Leimel, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4187, at *33 (noting that other factors such as
descriptive statements of "first quality" established that the sale misled the public).
131 Id. at *32 (emphasis added).
132 See, e.g., id. at *26 ("ST had acquired requisite secondary meaning, identifying the goods
as Pioneer's ....); id. at *28 ("Customers who purchased the Fabric were likely to be and were
confused about the 'source' and quality of the goods they received. The Fabric was invoiced as
'ST' with Pioneer numbers. Customers were led to believe they were receiving not just goods
originally manufactured by Pioneer, but Pioneer first quality goods from an authorized
representative. The use of 'ST,' the receipt and diversion of purchase orders directed to Pioneer,
and the absence of any disclaimer on the Fabric constituted a representation that the Fabric was
the same quality as the goods distributed through Pioneer's authorized channels." (emphasis
added)).
133 The court's discussion seems to be limited to section 43(a)(1)(A), which deals with
trademark infringement. It did not discuss whether Hughes' acts constituted false advertising
under section 43(a)(1)(B). See id. at *29. The sale of damaged goods under the original mark
was discussed once again in United Brake Sys. v. Am. Envtl. Protection, Inc., 963 S.W.2d 749
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). After a fire destroyed UBS's factory, UBS hired the defendant, AEP, to
remove the debris and to dispose of its damaged brake linings. For safety and reputational
reasons, UBS wanted to ensure that the damaged breaks bearing its marks would not get into the
marketplace. AEP, however, had a different plan: It allowed a subcontractor to resell the
damaged linings. At trial UBS presented evidence that buyers of brake linings believed they had
purchased quality products from a person authorized to sell them. UBS argued that the sale of the
damaged linings constituted trademark infringement (in violation of sections 43(a)(1)(A) and 32
of the Lanham Act). Id. at 759. The question whether the resale of the salvaged breaks
constituted false advertising was not even raised. Id. at 757. In affirming the trial court's
decision, the court rejected AEP's reliance on Dunhill, emphasizing the fact that in Dunhill the

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

V.

[Vol. 31:2

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A product containing no sapphires cannot be sold under the mark
"Polysapphire," nor can one sell a product containing no gelatin under
the mark "Gelatin Snacks." The mark "Syrup of Figs" is false and
misleading in connection to a product not containing figs, and so is
"Riselyte" in connection to a product containing no rice. Yet, affixing
"Dunhill," a mark that the public has learned to associate with high
quality tobacco, to damaged tins, or "Dr. Price" to a phosphate baking
powder which was touted for sixty-six years as not containing any
phosphate, does not give rise to a false advertising claim.
Put
differently, a descriptive mark can enter through the gate of section
43(a)(1)(B); fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks cannot.
This Article shows that this bizarre outcome is the result of the
inter-brand approach that dominated the law of trademark and unfair
competition and the narrow view that "the only legally relevant function
of a trademark is to impart information as to the source. ' 134 This
Article, on the other hand, argues that a trademark often provides
information about the product itself and that such information reduces
consumers' error costs. More specifically, it reduces consumers'
uncertainty with regard to credence qualities, thereby impacting the
number of units purchased. The flip side is that a trademark-any
trademark-may be used by its owner to mischaracterize its own goods.
Trademark law, however, protects consumers primarily against passingoff. It provides the trademark owner with a cause of action against
sellers that wish to free ride on the owner's goodwill. It does not
provide a remedy against the seller (the mark owner) that uses its own
non-descriptive trademark to mischaracterize its own product.
The law of false advertising was also limited to inter-brand
settings. Beginning with cases such as American Washboard, courts
held that absent passing-off a private cause of action could not arise
under trademark or false advertising law. "Just fraud" on one's own
consumers was not actionable. This is well illustrated in Royal Baking
Powder Co. v. FTC, where the petitioner (relying on American
Washboard) boldly argued "that no statute or decided case has declared
that a manufacturer or trader owes to his competitors the duty of
refraining from misrepresentation of the quality or ingredients of his
"lawful owner of the goods at issue voluntarily permitted the insurance company to salvage and
sell the goods," whereas UBS took all the necessary steps to ensure that its linings would not be
sold. Id. at 755.
134 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968); see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
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own goods, and that, on the contrary, it has been firmly held that no
135
such duty exists."'
In 1946, with the enactment of the Lanham Act, the law of false
advertising was broadened to include intra-brand fraud. Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act as amended in 1988 provides that any person who
uses "any word, term, name, symbol, or device" to "misrepresent[] the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her goods
shall be liable in a civil action."' 136 For historical reasons, the old interbrand view has taken precedence over the plain wording of section
43(a)(1)(B). Arguing against this situation, this Article suggests courts
adopt the interpretation that follows from a strict reading of the Lanham
Act. Providing a competitor with a private cause of action against the
seller who uses a suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful mark to misrepresent
its own products will complete a process that started over half a century
ago and will harmonize the law of false advertising with the law of
trademark abandonment. It will assign competitors their traditional role
as the "avenger of the public" and relieve the heavy burden which rests
today on the narrow shoulders of the FTC.' 37 To hold otherwise would
be to condone public deceit.

135 281 F. 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1922).
136 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
137 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.

